Is it possible to justify the existence of another minds? Dharmakirti and Ratnakirti in the context of analytical philosophy

The article examines the justification of belief in other minds in the Buddhist epistemological tradition and analytic philosophy. It focuses on Dharmakīrti’s Proof of Other Mindstreams and Ratnakīrti’s Refutation of Other Mindstreams. The Buddhist formulation does not presuppose a substantial subject: what is at issue is another causally continuous stream of mental events. Dharmakīrti infers such a stream from perceived manifestations of speech and purposive action. His argument combines analogy with causal inference from an effect and is validated through the practical success of behaviour based on it. Ratnakīrti objects that the connection between action and another person’s intention cannot be independently established, while the distinction between one’s own and another stream already presupposes knowledge of both relata. Comparing this debate with J. S. Mill’s argument from analogy, L. Wittgenstein’s criterial approach, and inference to the best explanation makes it possible to distinguish ontological certainty from epistemic justification. The article argues that the existence of another mind cannot be demonstrated with apodictic certainty. Nevertheless, belief in other minds is rationally warranted at the conventional level because it provides the strongest explanation of the independent, meaningful, and responsive behaviour of other living beings.

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